Saturday, June 29, 2019
STALIN AND THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
June 22, 1941 - 78 years ago, fascist Germany treacherously attacked the Soviet Union. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the German fascist invaders (1941–1945).
The beginning of the Great Patriotic War and the events that preceded the beginning of the war were the subject of many years of fierce disputes, often from diametrically opposite positions, especially in assessing the role of I.V. Stalin in these events. I do not have the opportunity to consistently state the course of events, say, from the signing of the Barbarossa plan by Hitler until December 1941. And my goal is completely different. It is important for us to understand: How did Stalin assess the situation in pre-war Europe, the political, economic, military situation of the Soviet Union? How did he imagine the beginning and course of the future war? What was his plan? What goals, in his opinion, it was necessary to achieve?
By the time Hitler signed the Barbarossa Plan (Directive No. 21) on December 18, 1940, the situation in Europe resembled a boiling pot. France, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Austria had already been captured by Hitler, the capture of unruly Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941 forced Hitler to postpone the attack on the USSR for five weeks. Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Italy, Spain became one rank with Germany, Germany and England fought hard, but Hitler had already decided (September 19, 1940) to abandon the invasion of England, the air raids on England served only as a cover for Hitler’s plans for a sudden and crushing attack on the Soviet Union. On May 10, 1941, Rudolf Hess flew to England with plans (not implemented) to “pacify” Germany and England. In America, which had not yet entered world war, the isolationist (essentially pro-fascist) forces played a huge role.
Very effective Soviet intelligence almost every day gave Stalin more and more information about the Barbarossa plan and the movement of more and more divisions to the borders of the USSR. There was a lot of misinformation, in particular, about the exact date of the attack on the USSR. And the Führer himself finally approved June 22 as the date of the attack only 12 days before the start of the war. The plans of Hitler to attack the USSR and knew Churchill and Roosevelt. Eight days before the start of the war, Churchill sent a telegram to Roosevelt: "Judging by the information from all the sources at my disposal, including the most reliable, the Germans will in the near future make the strongest attack on Russia ...". In any case, the version promoted by the Hitlerites that the movement of the German troops to the border with the USSR was aimed at distracting attention from the preparation of an invasion of England already few believed. The situation inevitably unfolded in the direction of a head-on collision of Germany, and in essence - the whole of Europe occupied by the Germans, with the first socialist country - the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union has long been extremely intensively preparing to repel aggression. So, at the XVIII All-Union Conference of the CPSU (b), which opened on January 20, 1941, it was decided "On accelerating the growth rate of the defense industry." Almost half of the state budget of the country was allocated for defense - 43.4%. Created and went into a series of new, modern types of aircraft, tanks, small arms. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) helped enterprises manufacturing new military equipment to supply scarce raw materials and the latest equipment. In order for the large defense plants to have everything they needed and to ensure the implementation of tasks, experienced party workers and prominent specialists were sent there as party organizers of the Central Committee. In the East of the country, backup enterprises were built at an accelerated pace, which allowed the evacuation of 2600 enterprises from the European part and put them into operation in the shortest possible time. Improved organizational structure of the Red Army. The total number of the Red Army from 1939 to the German attack on the USSR almost tripled, reaching 5,373 thousand people in June 1941. And yet, the Soviet Union was still inferior in military power to the forces of a potential aggressor — Germany and its many satellites and allies. Extremely frankly, Molotov said this in his conversation with Felix Chuev: “... We knew that the war was not far off, that we were weaker than Germany, that we would have to retreat. The whole question was how far we would have to retreat — before Smolensk or Moscow, we discussed this before the war. ” For the rearmament of the Red Army there was a shortage of 12-18 months. But war was inevitable!
Before Stalin, it was he who concentrated all political and “ideological” power in the country in his own hands, and the fatal question was how to ensure victory, victory at any cost, victory for the sake of preserving Leninist heritage, preserving socialism!
There were three layers of questions: ideological, political, and purely military!
In ideological terms, the most important question is to ensure the unity of Soviet society in the face of terrible danger, to ensure an understanding of the justice ahead.
In the struggle, the immediate awareness of every Soviet person of his place in the common struggle, faith in the ultimate victory. But fresh, very fresh, were memories of cowardice, meanness, betrayal in the attacks of Hitler on France, on Poland.
And Hitler openly proclaimed: "The USSR is a house of cards, it is a colossus with clay feet — push it and everything will fall apart." In political terms, the whole world should have understood, believed that the attack on the USSR was completely unexpected both for the Soviet Government and the Soviet people, that it was not provoked by the USSR. And before the eyes of Stalin, Hitler’s recent provocation with an attack (allegedly by the Poles, in fact, the Germans themselves) on a German radio station in Glewitz, which gave rise to Hitler’s attack on Poland, was the reason for the start of the World War.
The aggressor, even the most unprincipled and vile, does not want to be considered the culprit of the war. And Hitler, attacking the USSR, declared in a note given to Molotov by Ribbentrop on June 22, 1941, that Germany could no longer tolerate the aggressive, defiant behavior of the Soviet side, that it had to take adequate measures of self-defense. Literally, it says "... Based on the facts stated, the Reich government is compelled to declare: The Soviet Government, contrary to its obligations and in clear contradiction with its solemn statements, acted against Germany, namely: 1. The subversive work against Germany and Europe was not simply continued, but with beginning of the war (world, ed. S.Kh.) is also strengthened. 2. Foreign policy became increasingly hostile towards Germany. 3. All the armed forces on the German border were concentrated and deployed in readiness for an attack ...
The German government cannot be indifferent to the serious threat on the eastern border. Therefore, the Fuhrer gave the order to the German armed forces by all means and means to ward off this threat. The German people realize that in the upcoming struggle they are called upon not only to defend their homeland, but also to save world civilization from the deadly danger of Bolshevism and to clear the way for a true flourishing in Europe. ” As might be expected, the thief shouts: “Hold the thief”! That's where, from Hitler's propaganda, grew "Icebreaker" of Suvorov - Rezun! Stalin could not, of course, not to reckon with provocations, lies, as a pretext for war. In purely military terms, Stalin was faced with the task of preventing a "blitzkrieg" at any cost. But Stalin knew perfectly well that Hitler was counting on a “blitzkrieg”! Already in the first lines of the “Barbarossa” plan it is written: “The German armed forces must be ready to defeat Soviet Russia during the short-term campaign before the war against England is over ... The retreat of enemy-capable troops to the wide open spaces of Russian territory must be prevented.” What could be done here?
To stretch, to expand in time the first terrible blow of the superior forces of the Germans. No major battles in the first days and weeks of the war! Exposing the first, second, third echelons of defense, hacking which the enemy will lose tempo, will expire, will not be able to tighten the reserves for the decisive assault on Moscow - the main goal of the Hitlerite offensive! In reality, this issue was resolved by Stalin as follows: on the eve of the outbreak of war, only border detachments of the NKVD troops, numbering 100,000, carried the immediate guard of the border.
And all the other troops, 170 divisions, were located at a considerable distance from the border - the first echelon of cover was 56 divisions at a distance of 8-20 km, the second echelon - 52 divisions at a distance of 50-100 km, and the reserve - 62 divisions at a distance of the order 400 km. It was impossible to conduct a general mobilization, to concentrate the bulk of the troops in close proximity to the border, either from a political or from a military point of view. Stalin understood this. But he also understood that he could and would be blamed for “not understanding something, or not knowing something”, that he “believed the scoundrel Hitler with his non-aggression pact”, that he “was confused, fell into prostration, ”ascribe other delusions. In fact, Stalin had to with irony restrain the impulses of the military, the General Staff, in their desire to take the preventive measures that seemed to them extremely necessary with mobilization, deployment, advancement, etc., which from their military point of view were absolutely necessary. Stalin understood one thing - it was necessary to win not in a separate battle, but to achieve victory in the war, to lead the country to victory. Such was the program of action. And it fully corresponded to Lenin's statement: “Politics is the cause, and war is only its tool, and not vice versa. Consequently, we can only subordinate the political views of political ".
That is what Stalin did. But, after all, the Germans also “estimated” the possible behaviors of the Soviet leadership at least at the initial stage of the war. In the German military document entitled "Etude Lossberg" dated September 15, 1940, three possible options for action by Soviet troops are given. First: Russians will want to preempt us and with this... will not negotiate, nor conclude a truce or a peace treaty, except with the mutual consent. " Roosevelt on June 24, 1941, at a press conference at the White House, explicitly stated that the United States would assist Russia in its struggle against Hitler. Stalin’s policy powerfully stimulated the creation of the anti-Hitler coalition. The configuration of the warring parties in the war is fully defined and preserved until the end of the war.
Militarily, events developed in the way they, in general, should have developed. Difficult. Painfully. With huge, but inevitable losses. During the three weeks of the war, the enemy advanced in the north-west direction by 400-500 km, in the west 450-600 km and in the south-west - by 300-350 km. Tens of thousands of border guards died in the first week. The fighters of the Smolensk battle, who detained the Germans for two months, also died for good reason - they made a huge contribution to the great cause of slowing down the German avalanche. The most important thing happened - the Germans' hopes of a “blitzkrieg” were crumbling! On August 11, 1941, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces wrote: "The general situation shows more and more clearly that the colossus Russia ... was underestimated by us." German divisions and corps were ground, thousands of tanks and aircraft were destroyed. The German report of August 28 says: “The number of trucks in motorized divisions dropped by 1/2, in reserve units dropped by 1/4, and in infantry divisions also by 1/4. Parts of the 1st tank group on average lost 50% of their tanks. Parts of the 2nd tank group have an average of 45% of their tanks ... ".
In late September 1941, the battle for Moscow began. To strike at Moscow, the enemy concentrated up to 80 divisions, or about 40% of all his forces, including 3/4 of all tank divisions. At the most tense moment of the fighting, German intelligence gave erroneous information that Soviet strategic reserves had been exhausted. Meanwhile, there were 12 rifle divisions, 19 rifle brigades, 20 artillery regiments, 8 separate rocket artillery divisions in the rear of the armies of the Western Front. These troops, who were in reserve when the German offensive on Moscow exhausted, entered the battle by order of Stalin and decided the outcome of the battle of Moscow. Near Moscow, the Red Army finally frustrated the calculations of the Nazis to achieve a "lightning victory" over the Soviet Union. The myth of the invincibility of the fascist army was buried on the fields of the Moscow region.
The second major event on the way of the Soviet people to victory was the grand battle of Stalingrad, in which more than two million people participated on both sides. After the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad, a complete, irreversible turn in the war was achieved. The enemy was both ideologically and militarily broken. The superiority in armaments, manpower, economic power of the Soviet Union, the Red Army has become undeniable. So, if in June 1941, the Soviet production of tanks was half German, then by the autumn of 1942 it had reached the German level, and by the end of the war there were three times more German. Similarly, by aircraft, in June 1941 the production of the newest models of aircraft in the USSR was three times less than German, by the autumn of 1942 it was equal to the German one, and by the end of the war it was seven times higher than the German one. It is necessary to know and remember that the total supplies of the United States by Lend-Lease did not exceed in their volume and 4% of military products delivered to the front by the national economy of the USSR. After Stalingrad, there was only one thing left - to consistently, without stopping, drive the fascist beast into his lair.
Summarizing, we can say that all the main components of the Stalinist plan of victory over the enemy were correct, deeply thought out. Only Stalin himself, with his indisputable authority, his colossal will and endurance could realize this extremely tough, one might say - cruel, plan of struggle, which ensured our victory. "The happiness of the Soviet people was that Joseph Stalin stood at the head of the country." (V. Molotov)
S.V. Khristenko